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Book Review 
Léa Veinstein, Les philosophes lisent Kafka: Benjamin, 
Arendt, Adorno, Anders (Éditions de la Maison des 
sciences de l'homme: Paris, 2019). 
Franz Kafka died in 1924. Most of his writing appeared posthumously. 
Philosophic readings accompanied Kafka’s writings quite early in the 
posthumous reception, and—especially in recent years—there has been a 
steady increase of work from various philosophic perspectives on Kafka’s 
writings. Léa Veinstein’s Les philosophes lisent Kafka: Benjamin, Arendt, Adorno, 
Anders is a noteworthy addition to this burgeoning body of inquiry. 
Veinstein’s book provides original analyses of Kafka’s writings, and original 
readings of texts by Walter Benjamin, Hannah Arendt, Theodor W. Adorno, 
and Günther Anders (formerly Günther Stern), who write on Kafka amidst 
the political and societal turmoil they experience as German Jews in mid-
twentieth-century Europe. Veinstein claims these four philosophers 
encounter Kafka through the experience of exile that affected all four as 
Jewish refugees and earlier—through inner exile—as Jews in an openly anti-
Semitic environment (293). 
Veinstein’s exercise of “la practique de l’histoire des idées” befits a book 
associated with the “Groupe de recherche sur la culture de Weimar” in Paris 
and appears in this group’s Série Philia of the Bibliothéque allemande edited by 
Gérard Raulet. Veinstein is currently chercheuse associée at the Groupe Weimar. 
In Les philosophes lisent Kafka, Veinstein’s frequent usage of the German 
term Erlebnis could be confusing. Erlebnis is often translated into English as 
“lived experience,” into French as l’expérience vécue or simply le vécu. Veinstein 
postulates a correlation of Franz Kafka’s Erlebnis and the sens profond of 
Kafka’s œuvre; she also postulates a correlation between Franz Kafka’s 
Erlebnis, on the one hand, and the Erlebnis of, and writings on Kafka by, 
Benjamin, Adorno, Arendt, and Anders, on the other (29). None of the four 
philosophers follow, however, Wilhelm Dilthey’s claim that the key to 
understanding literature is the Erlebnis of the literary author. Benjamin and 
Adorno explicitly oppose it; Arendt and Anders—perhaps influenced by the 
mixed reception of Dilthey in early Heideggerian phenomenology—do not 
quite adopt it. Although Veinstein does not expressly cite the Diltheyian 
postulate of the primacy of Erlebnis for interpretation of human expression, 
her repeated usage of the term Erlebnis (29, 36–41, 44, 56, 61, 72–76, 81, 292–
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294) to describe one of her foci might initially confuse readers familiar with
early critical theory and Heideggerian phenomenology.
This possible confusion takes little away, however, from Veinstein’s 
argument that examination of Kafka’s writings is enhanced by taking into 
account his experience as a Jew in the Austro-Hungarian empire and as a 
German-speaking Jew in the largely Czech environment of Prague and later 
in the first Czechoslovak republic. Neither does the possible confusion 
regarding Erlebnis detract from her notion that there is a relevance of the 
experiences of Benjamin, Adorno, Arendt, and Anders as Jews, and as 
refugees, to what they eventually write on Kafka’s writings (36–37). For 
Veinstein, the relevant “Kafkan” experience is the devenir-étranger du 
sujet (37). 
Veinstein contends that Benjamin, Adorno, Arendt, and Anders share 
with Kafka’s works la métaphysique de l’étrangeté (36, 60–69, 71, 295). Her usage 
of the term métaphysique could create more perplexity than does Veinstein’s 
actual elaboration of the affinity based on l’étrangeté. Certain ideas of Jacques 
Derrida play a pivotal role in Veinstein’s book (76–82, 239–246), although 
Derrida regards metaphysics as the opponent of deconstruction. 
 Veinstein’s frequent invocations of la métaphysique do not, nonetheless, 
significantly diminish her main points: “le sujet découvre en lui un étranger,” 
and correlatively “la philosophie s’ouvre à la littérature.” Benjamin, Adorno, 
Arendt, and Anders confront the metamorphosis of philosophy by literature. 
Veinstein’s principal concerns are metamorphosis in Kafka’s writings, and 
metamorphosis in the relationship of philosophy and literature (13).  
  Benjamin’s Kafka essay of 1934 and his earlier and later texts on Kafka 
present the relevant metamorphosis as a “déformation [in Benjamin’s 
German, Entstellung]” of space and time (100–112). This distortion or 
deformation results from the intrusion of the Vorwelt. Veinstein translates the 
German term die Vorwelt with the French le monde primitif or simply le primitif 
(102–7, 124). La préhistoire or le prémonde might be more accurate translations, 
but Veinstein uses terminology that is given in the French translation by 
Maurice de Gandillac as revised by Pierre Rusch. (In one instance, moreover, 
Benjamin’s German does—as Veinstein notes on page 105—refer to how the 
totem poles of so-called Primitiven lead to consideration of ancestors, 
including animals.)  For Benjamin, the Vorwelt precedes any humanly 
constituted world; it is the ineradicable and intractable intrusion that distorts, 
and thereby somehow calls into question, any conventional experience of 
space and time. The carrefour of the political and the mystical (Veinstein calls 
the latter the religious or the theological) is in Benjamin’s reading “bien 
constitué par l’idée de déformation (Entstellung) ou de métamorphose 
(Verwandlung), qui contamine le temps, l’espace, le sens, l’écriture, et la 
transcendence” (125). The political in this distortion is its freeing of time, 
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space, sense, and writing from presumed transcendence by those who would 
command. 
Benjamin demonstrates the metamorphosis of philosophy by literature 
not only by letting Kafka’s writings impact philosophy, but also by 
supplementing his account of Kafka’s writings with a Talmudic legend, an 
absurd Jewish joke, and a cryptic recounting of a Russian legend (through 
Alexander Pushkin), all of which contribute to the literary character of 
Benjamin’s writing on Kafka’s literature (212–221). 
Like Benjamin, Adorno—notably in his well-known essay of 1953 and in 
some letters to Benjamin—finds in Kafka some help for conceiving modernity 
as “métamorphose de l’espace-temps” (128, Veinstein’s italics). Yet Adorno rejects 
Benjamin’s emphasis on a preponderant Vorwelt: “Adorno rejette l’idée d’une 
présence du ‘primitif’ ou d’un ‘passé ancestral’ chez Kafka” (128).  Adorno 
prefers more dialectic in the reading of Kafka, a dialectic that he thinks would 
remove the risk of a reactionary archaism (129). Like Benjamin, Adorno is 
fascinated by Kafka’s “fuite vers l’inhumain en passant par l’homme,” but he 
sees in this flight a regression. For Adorno, there is in Kafka “une regression 
de l’homme, qui se trouve déshumanisé, et du sujet qui se trouve dénué de 
tout rapport à son intériorité . . . et de tout rapport à l’extérieur” (141, see too 
146). Kafka highlights this human alienation (169). The metamorphosis in 
Kafka is societal: “Kafka était au fait des mutations profondes de la société, y 
compris des mutations économiques” (147). Adorno’s Kafka reading is, 
moreover, “plus frontalement ‘théorique’, moins littéraire” (131) than 
Benjamin’s reading, not least because Adorno’s reading does not follow 
Kafka’s own writings as much (132–133): “Adorno theorise ce que Benjamin met 
en pratique (la métamorphose de la philosophie)” (135).  
In the 1940s, Arendt writes on Kafka. She also briefly discusses Kafka in 
later works. Veinstein notes that Arendt is concerned with the prospect of 
living as a human being with human beings whereby peoples also live as 
peoples with other peoples (176). In this light, she even treats Kafka’s “In the 
Penal Colony” as anticipatory of the gas chambers (174). Above all, she 
concentrates on “l’homme de bonne volonté,” who is K. in both The Trial and 
The Castle (156–165). The predicaments of K. convey to us that “notre 
humanité s’était perdue” but thereby pose for us the hope “de redevenir 
humain” (164, Veinstein’s italics). Kafka “révèle quelque chose de l’absurdité 
du monde réel” (174) and “dévoile des structures qui ont rendu possible la 
disparition de l’humanité” (175). The theme of deformation is evident in 
Arendt’s demonstration that “chez Kafka, les personnages cherchent à 
redevenir des hommes” (165). They have lost the possibility of world-
opening; there is “la privation du monde,” and yet there is “la figure de la 
‘bonne volonté’ qui s’ancre dans un désir de reconquérir l’humanité” (169). 
Registering “un désir de retrouver le monde et de redevenir humain” (176), 
the metamorphosis in Kafka’s writing enacts loss and hope; in Kafka, loss 
metamorphosizes as hope (177–179). 
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Anders’s early written and published views on Kafka influenced Arendt, 
but his book on Kafka, Kafka: Pro und Contra (1951), is quite unusual (153, 181); 
his “façon” of relating philosophy and literature “est tout à fait singulière” 
(182). According to Veinstein, Anders finds in Kafka “la matière d’un profond 
renversement métaphysique” whereby the human is no longer Heidegger’s 
world opener but is rather without world (184). It may be questionable to 
propose that Heidegger has a metaphysics to be reversed. More central to 
Veinstein’s discussion is, however, the notion that Anders’s anti-fascism 
impels his repugnance for what he considers Kafka’s servility, assimilation, 
obedience, submission, undecidability, conformity, and dependence (189, 
192, 198, 200). Anders even claims that the idolizing of Kafka is an effacement 
of the assassination of millions (191), and asserts that it would be impossible 
to read Kafka while one is forced to live in a Kafkaesque manner (192): in other 
words, reading Kafka is a luxury of those who do not have to live the way 
Kafka depicts.  
Veinstein objects that, in some respects, Anders’s “analyse” of Kafka 
“semble très éloignée de son objet d’étude” (190), although she recognizes that 
Anders provides an innovative take on the “‘déformation’ (Entstellung)” in 
Kafka’s literature (194). Anders notes that deformation in Kafka may entail a 
hybridité of philosophy and literature, but—in Anders’s view—this kind of 
literary distortion makes “Kafka un auteur ‘philosophiquement inutilisable’” 
(202). Detecting in Kafka “l’absence de toute vérité univoque,” Anders 
separates philosophy and literature, exercising what Veinstein calls une 
condamnation de la fiction. Anders’s disdain for Kafka’s ambiguïté indécidable is 
such that Anders seems to reproach Kafka for being an écrivain: “Il y aurait 
chez Kafka un déficit de vérité, en somme, qui ferait de la fiction un barrage 
contra la possibilité même de la philosophie” (203). According to Veinstein, 
Anders does not quite understand that Kafka provides “une métamorphose 
de l’idée même de vérité, donc de la philosophie” (203, see too 297). 
For Veinstein, “la vérité est pensée en son indécidabilité; et c’est en cela que 
Kafka rend possible l’articulation entre fiction et philosophie” (204). Precisely 
the tension between philosophy and literature makes their rapport 
philosophically important (228). This tension arises in the resistance of 
literature to the demand of philosophy for sense or meaning (264). 
Of principal interest to Veinstein is the “[m]étamorphose de la 
philosophie qui se construit . . . à partir de sa confrontation à la littérature” 
(85). In choosing the word [m]étamorphose, Veinstein of course borrows the 
title of one of Kafka’s best-known stories (“Die Verwandlung”); she 
characterizes the philosophic impetus in much of Kafka’s writing, and the 
effect of Kafka’s writing on philosophy, as “métamorphose” (87–88). 
In Veinstein’s view, Benjamin, Arendt, Adorno, and Anders “lisent Kafka 
en brouillant souvent les frontières entre philosophie et littérature.”  Among 
the four philosophers, Benjamin undertakes philosophy in its rapport with 
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literature to a point at which Benjamin himself is transformed into an écrivain, 
whereas Anders goes furthest in suggesting that Kafka remains too literary to 
become a philosopher (211). 
Veinstein herself is closest to Benjamin. Benjamin treats Kafka as “un 
‘narrateur’ hybride, à la fois philosophe et écrivain” (212, Veinstein’s italics, 
see also 213–218). Veinstein claims the movement of philosophy towards 
literature, and the “dissolution de la parole du philosophe dans celle de 
l’écrivain . . . ne sont aussi sensibles que dans l’interprétation de Benjamin” 
(219, see too 297). With regard to the metamorphosis involved, Veinstein 
remarks: “le philosophe, en métamorphosant la philosophie, s’identifie 
tellement à l’écrivain qu’il en épouse la fonction. Le philosophe est pris dans 
un devenir-écrivain” (219). Although “plus ‘métathéorique’” than Benjamin, 
Adorno “s’autorise quelques ‘percées littéraires’ en forme d’hommage à 
Benjamin.”  Like Anders, Arendt writes in clear commentary and literary 
analysis that connects with a “réflexion philosophico-politique” (204). 
Anders, however, most adamantly separates philosophy and literature (204–
205), thus demonstrating a disregard for the intractable particularity of any 
expression, including philosophic expression. This particularity is brought to 
the fore in literature; that is how literature metamorphizes philosophy. 
Anders shows “l’absence de réflexion sur son propre geste, c’est-à-dire sur la 
possibilité et les conditions de l’interprétation philosophique d’une œuvre 
littéraire” (228, Veinstein’s italics, see too 297). 
Veinstein emphasizes, moreover, that Benjamin is especially interested in 
“une autre dimension de la métamorphose, qui définit la littérature comme 
l’expérience d’un devenir-animal” (255). She would like him, however, to go 
further. She notes that difficulities nos quatre philosophes have with the Kafkan 
ambiguity regarding human/animal distinctions correlate with the difficulty 
philosophy often has with literature: “si nos quatre philosophes demeurent 
devant la littéralité du devenir-animal . . . c’est parce qu’ils se trouvent pris 
dans l’histoire de la philosophie, dont l’animalité (ou le fait de devenir un 
animal) est l’un des impensés fondamentaux” (240–241,  Veinstein’s italics). 
With the term littéralité, Veinstein refers not only to the quality of being 
literature but also to the way in which some of Kafka’s stories have animals 
literally speak to us, and thereby give animality, as well as literature, a special 
importance (298–299). 
According to Veinstein, all four of the discussed philosophers to some 
extent balk not only at greater interaction of philosophy and literature but 
also, and correlatively, before animality. “Lorsque ces lecteurs sont 
philosophes, lorsqu’ils tentent de lire Kafka depuis la philosophie, cette tension 
semble atteindre un point plus vif encore: car la philosophie est ici attirée par 
la recherche du sens, et interdite par la présence de tout ce qui, par nature, lui 
est étranger ou impropre: la fiction, littéralité, l’animal” (291, Veinstein’s 
italics). 
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Veinstein traces Kafka’s development of a literature that challenges 
philosophy in two of its ostensible fundaments: the principle of 
noncontradiction and, correlatively, the distinction of the human from the 
nonhuman animal (229–234). The metamorphoses enacted by Kafka’s 
writings—such as figures alternating between human and nonhuman 
characteristics—draw philosophy into dilemmas it often tends to overlook 
(235–239). To formulate the ensuing possibility of a metamorphosis of 
philosophy, Veinstein turns to Derrida’s L’animal que donc je suis (Paris: 
Galilée, 2006): “Derrida travaille en miroir deux distinctions: celle entre 
l’homme et l’animal, et celle entre la philosophie et la littérature” (241). The 
Kafkan becoming-animal involves a metamorphosis of philosophy by 
literature to the point at which philosophy has difficulty ignoring the 
ambiguity created for its distinctions of human and animal (245–246). 
Veinstein traces ways in which Kafka’s literature moves philosophy to open 
to animality as something especially inaccessible to conceptualization (299). 
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s Kafka: Pour une littérature mineure (Paris: 
Éditions de Minuit, 1975) also facilitates Veinstein’s analyses in this regard 
(247–251, 257), but Derrida is especially helpful in associating questions of 
human and animal with questions of philosophy and literature, and in 
presenting literature as something that renders distinctions of human and 
animal, and correlatively of philosophy and literature, ambiguous (299, 251). 
Léa Veinstein is known for her contributions to French radio, her essays, 
and a fascinating book in which she explores her sense of Jewish heritage 
while piecing together a story about her paternal great grandfather, who 
officiated at the synagogue in Neuilly-sur-Seine during the German 
occupation (Isaac [Paris: Grasset, 2019]). She has, furthermore, edited an 
interesting collection of essays on philosophy and Kafka, also with the title 
Les philosophes lisent Kafka (in Les cahiers philosophiques de Strasbourg, no. 33, 
2013). In the book under review, she provides thoughtful reflection on Kafka’s 
writings, on philosophic readings of Kafka, and on the rapport of philosophy 
and literature. 
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